(I also posted this earlier in the wrong place, sorry if you've already read it ... still feeling my way around this forum thingy!!!)
I'm very new to all this ACT/RFT stuff, but as a (mature-age) B.Psyc honours student about to embark on researching and practicing in the field of CBT/ACT etc, I must ask my 'silly' question and risk looking like a complete 'clutz'!
My interpretation of generativity and symbolism in language, from RFT perspective is that they are innate processes, and are seen in behaviouristic terms because the developoment of those processes is guided by contextual interactions with the environment, which in turn creates a repertoir of behaviour patterns and responses. Am I wrong in thinking that this smacks of determinism? Not that I have a problem with that concept, just curious to see if I'm on the right track with the underlying principles of the theory.
Further, it seems to me that to move past negative behaviours by using such therapies as ACT or RFT, one requires the cognitive functions of acceptance, mindfulness, presence, defusion etc. I am really having a problem seeing how a therapy that creates a cognitive shift, can work without any cognitive input...!
Perhaps the answer is for me to do a lot more reading, but I would greatly appreciate some guidance from those of you who really know this stuff!
From what I have seen so far, I am very excited at the prospect of seeing the ACT movement blossom, as it strikes me as the very essence of what really happens when people reach that point of shifting from a negative behaviour to a positive one, or have the ability to just get on with their lives and really be happy given seemingly debilitating circumstances. Even more impressive when they have had no therapy at all! It's that shift that I find so intriguing, and want to research.
Anyway, I hope somebody can set me straight, and I thank you in anticipation!
Jaci Richards.
Cognitive shift
Hi Jaci, here Jacqui,
About the nature/nurture thing I do not know to answer you. But about the cognitive shift I am going to try. You wrote: I am really having a problem seeing how a therapy that creates a cognitive shift, can work without any cognitive input...!
The thing is, that there are two ways to look at cognitions. One is content, the other is that it is a proces/behavior, that can lead to content. People think, which means they derive relations between events and they transform functions. Deriving relations is leading to content like: John is bigger than Tom, fear is bad, spiders are dangerous.
Transformation of functions is leading to behavioral alternatives. When I discover that spiders can be colourfull animals (for instance someone could say to me: have you noticed that spiders have all kind of colours like butterflies), I might get curious how this spider looks like. If I learn that fear in for instance a social situation must not be followed by running away, I can open up to other possibilities of the situation and other experiences.
So ACT is about transformation of stimulusfunctions. It does so by changing the context. The current context leads people to stick to the functions that lead them away from direct experience. A new context leads them to direct experience. Metaphors and experiential exercises are designed to do just that. (It is never purely changing stimulus functions, but it is certainly aimed at that)
Differently put: If you look at cognition as behavior in stead of as content, you get a different approach and you do not have to look at the content to change the behavior. You look at the context of the behavior. As a result content may or may not change.
Maybe you could compare this to a factory where they make cars. If you want to know what they are doing, you could look at the cars they make, but you could also try to understand how these cars are put together in the factory. And if you are not satisfied with the car you could change something about the car, but you could also change something about the proces of making them.
In a sense you could speak of metaphors and experiential expercises as cognitive input, though it is different from the input you have in cognitive disputations.
I hope this answers your question.
Jacqueline
Thank you
Hi Jacqui, thank you for your input. I will read over it a few times and try to digest the information!!
My main problem is that I'm trying to understand behaviour change therapies, by contrasting behavioural therapies and cognitive therapies, and not a combination of the two - if possible!
I think I have a handle on the behaviourist argument - in that our behaviours are a reflection/response created by our environment / stimuli. To change behaviour from this perspective requires a change of stimuli, be that literally or contextually, thereby creating a new, more desirable behaviour.
It's the separation of that perspective from a cognitive perspective that I have not completely grasped. To me, for a person to change the context of the way they view/think of something, that is to think of it in a different way, 'think' is a cognitive process - not just a stimulus!!... or is it, from a behaviourist point of view??!!
Am I just being naiive, or is there a fundamental point that I just haven't got ... yet?!!
cheers, Jaci.
BTW If anybody knows of any studies that have been done using JUST behaviour therapy, with no cognitive therapy, eg. RFT/ACT vs CBT, or CBT v BT, I would be eternally grateful for the references as I have to research this topic. Thank you.
CT and changing context
Hi Jaci,
I am not sure if this is what you mean but CT is about changing context. All therapy is about changing context. From the viewpoint of functional contextualism there is no other way to change behavior. If the therapist asks the client to think about X this is a contextual clue. If the therapist suggests to the client: whenever you start to think about having a heartattack think about the chances that you actually will have a heartattack, this is a contextual cue. But what happens when the client actually starts thinking the suggested thoughts and still does not take a train?
A BT-therapist in the old fashioned way, as I get it, would say: Go by train and the fear will diminish, that is what we call exposure. Now that is a contextual cue too. If the client will go by train he may find out that the contingencies he feared are not going to happen, thereby shaping his behavior.
And he may also find that he is still very frightened and not go by train.
I think the power of ACT is in bringing into context (that is, making people aware of this part of context and the influence this part of context may have on the behavior) is that you can be frightened and still go by train. And the reason why you would do that is because it would help you to make your values happen. And then contingencies change and shape behavior.
I do not think it is possible to find many therapists who actually are doing strict CT or strict BT. The best reading I can suggest is
Jacobson, N. S., Dobson, K. S., Truax, P. A., Addis, M. E., Koerner, K., Gollan, J. K., Gortner, E., & Prince, S. E. (1996). A component analysis of cognitive-behavioral treatment for depression. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 295-304.
By,
Jacqueline
CBT v BT
Thank you Jacqui (and others!),
I will get that paper and see if I can gain some insight from it. :-)
Cheers, Jaci.
Cognition as behaviour
Hi Jaci
I think the trouble you may be having is possibly related to how you are perceiving behaviourism. The philosophical root of the behaviourism that underpins RFT and ACT is Skinnerian Radical Behaviourism. From this perspective, EVERYTHING an organism can do is considered behaviour, including cognition. So it isn’t that behaviour analysis does not consider cognitions within its analysis, it just considers cognition to be another behaviour to be explained, and usually doesn’t give cognition any more of a higher status than other, perhaps more external, behaviours.
The primary difference between cognitive and behavioural psychology in this instance is that Radical Behaviourism doesn’t try to explain cognitive events by referring to other cognitive events. The reason being, if you try to explain a cognitive event by referring to another cognitive event (e.g. the reason this person thinks ‘x’ in a certain situation is because they have an ‘x’ schema etc.), you end up going in circles. You need another cognitive event to explain the schema, then another one to explain that one…etc.
Radical Behaviourists would suggest that cognitions are behaviour, and similar to other behaviour, they are elicited and shaped by the environment and an individuals learning history. Skinner put it rather nicely when he said (paraphrased) “changing a man’s mind involves changing his environment – verbal or otherwise”.
Attempting to look at entirely ‘behavioural’ therapies versus ‘cognitive’ therapies will be difficult because of these reasons – both generally deal with cognitions, but one (cognitive) gives cognitions ‘causal’ properties, while the other (radical behaviourism) suggests they are just other (probably internal verbal behaviours) that need to be explained.
I hope that helps a little
Dave
Got it!
Thanks Dave, you have given me a better understanding of where behaviourists are 'coming from' when it comes to explaining cognitive processes. I have to explain in a paper why behaviourists deem the cognitive component of CBT as unnecessary, and you have given me a good starting point for my research on this topic.
Cheers, Jaci.
RB vs. FC
I would say that the philosophical basis of ACT and RFT is functional contextualism, not Skinner's radical behaviorism. While I, and many other contextualists, would contend that Skinner's philosophy of science IS contextualistic, there are a number of other behaviorists and scholars who would disagree (and with good reason). Skinner's philosophy and system of psychology evolved over his career, and contains remnants of both contextualistic and mechanistic thinking. I view functional contextualism as a sort of clarification and streamlining of radical behaviorism into a more focused contextualistic form.
Incidentally, this doesn't negate the point Dave is making at all (because Skinner's radical behaviorism DOES view private events as behavior susceptible to the same types of analyses as overt behavior). :)